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DEFENSE DISCOVERY IN WHITE COLLAR
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Peter J. Henningt
INTRODUCTION
Can a defendant in a criminal prosecution subpoena the
President of the United States to produce documents that might
cast doubt on the credibility of the Government's principal
witness? While one might think the question did not arise until
the investigations of Presidents Nixon, Reagan, or Clinton; in
fact, it was Chief Justice Marshall who first considered that
issue in 1807 in United States v. Burr. In that case, the Chief
Justice, sitting as a district court judge, enforced a subpoena
duces tecum fromAaron Burr, the former Vice President during
Thomas Jefferson's administration.2 The subpoena sought to
compel the President to turn over correspondence he received
from General Wilkinson about Burr's conduct.3 Rejecting the
Government's argument that a court could not enforce a
subpoena directed to the President, Chief Justice Marshall
stated:
A subpoena duces tecum, then, may issue to any person to
whom an ordinary subpoena may issue, directing him to
bring any paper of which the party praying it has a right to
avail himself as testimony; if, indeed, that be the necessary
process for obtaining the view of such a paper.4
The trial of Aaron Burr for treason was perhaps the first high-
profile white collar criminal prosecution by the federal
government. Like most such cases, the issue of discovery of
documents played a pivotal role.
t Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. The Author appreciates
the helpful comments of Professor Ellen Podgor of the Georgia State University College
of Law. This Article is dedicated to the memory of my father, who feigned interest in my
work and always encouraged me to do better.
1. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C. Va. 1807).
2. See id.
3. See id.at 32.
4. Id. at 34-35.
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Allegations of white collar crime generally involve economic
transactions that ostensibly appear to be ordinary business
events. In most cases, the crucial question is not whether the
defendant engaged in the conduct at issue-that is usually
conceded-but whether the conduct rises to the level of being
criminal. To establish a white collar case, government agents
often pore over voluminous documents to determine whether
the transactions show a pattern of criminality from which a jury
can infer the requisite knowledge and intent on the part of the
defendant. For example, a health care fraud investigation can
involve hundreds or even thousands of separate procedures on
a large number of patients, with a high volume of billings to an
insurance company or claims for reimbursement under
Medicare. White collar prosecutions are "paper cases," in the
sense that the Government's principle proof of criminality
comes from comparing what a document discloses with witness
statements and other records. Without the paper, it is unlikely
that the Government could establish the elements of many
white collar crimes, especially those involving fraud, bribery, or
conflicts of interest. Unlike a street crime, there is no real
physical evidence of the white collar criminal's violation, much
less a scene of the crime.
If the Government must rely on the paper trail to establish its
case, then certainly a defendant needs access to the documents
related to the transactions to mount a defense. The elegant
simplicity of Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Burr
regarding a defendant's right to obtain documents is not,
however, reflected in the federal rules for discovery. Unlike the
Wilkinson correspondence at issue in Burr, whose existence
President Jefferson disclosed in a statement to Congress, 5 a
defendant in a white collar prosecution usually does not know
exactly what documents exist, or how they will affect the case.
The defendant's lack of knowledge can make the discovery of
documents a complicated dance because the burden is on the
defendant to establish the prosecutor's "possession" of the
documents and their "materiality" to a defense before gaining
access to them. The federal approach to discovery can be a
"heads I win, tails you lose" situation because the defendant
5. Seeid.at31.
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must show what is in the records before being permitted to
review them.
In a white collar case, the "smoking gun" document-a
statement in writing that shows clearly the defendant's criminal
state of mind-rarely exists. The government's case is often
circumstantial, while the defense must try to show through the
records that a crime did not take place, or at least that the
defendant did not intend that criminal conduct occur. Unlike
typical evidence in a street crime prosecution to which the
defendant routinely seeks access, such as a witness's criminal
record or tests on contraband, the documents required to defend
a white collar case can be almost any type of business record.
The documents are often quite ordinary, reflecting common
business transactions that may not appear to have any
appreciable impact on a case. Indeed, it is that very ordinariness
that may help to show a defendant's lack of knowledge or intent
in the transactions at issue. Identifying what it is the defendant
is looking for as "material" to a defense is often a difficult, if not
impossible, task without an opportunity to review the records.
Complicating discovery is the fact that some documents a
defendant needs may not be in the prosecutor's possession, and
indeed the government may not even know of their existence.
Yet, access to documents held by third parties is unnecessarily
curtailed in federal prosecutions because the courts have
misunderstood a defendant's authority to subpoena records
from a third party.
This Article considers the issue of document discovery in the
context of a federal white collar crime prosecution. Part I
reviews the potential sources of documents in such a
proceeding, discussing the various venues in which defendants
might find relevant documents, and Part II provides a general
overview of the issues related to discovery in a federal criminal
case. Part III analyzes discovery of documents from the
prosecutor's office under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(a)(1)(C) by considering the meaning of the terms "possession"
and "material" as they affect the defendant's effort to obtain
documents. Part IV deals with the issue of subpoenas to third
parties for records under Rule 17(c), arguing that the Supreme
Court's analysis of the scope of the authority to compel the
production of records misconstrues the nature of the Rule and
the contrasting positions of the criminal defendant and the
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federal prosecutor. The Article concludes that a fair reading of
Rules 16(a)(1)(C) and 17(c) would reveal that they are
complementary provisions that permit defendants to engage in
discovery of relevant documents that, while not permitting
"fishing expeditions," must allow the white collar criminal
defendant sufficient access to mount a credible defense.
I. PROLIFERATING PROCEEDINGS AND THE
AVALANCHE OF DOCuMENTS
The extent of economic regulation by federal and state
governments has undergone an enormous expansion, especially
since the 1970s. Prosecutors now give much greater attention to
white collar crime, and investigations take place over a broad
range of activity, from bank and securities fraud to public
corruption to abuses of the health care system.6 The expanding
jurisdiction of regulatory agencies to monitor markets and
investigate possible abuses, with the concomitant increase in
the staff needed to conduct extensive regulatory oversight, has
created the well-known problem of the so-called "parallel
proceeding." A number of federal statutes have both a civil and
a criminal component, raising the possibility of concurrent
investigations of the same conduct by different arms of the
government. At the federal level, only the Department of Justice
has the authority to bring criminal charges.' The regulatory
agencies are limited to civil enforcement of their statutes, and
those proceedings usually entail an extensive investigation by
the agency staff before the institution of proceedings. While the
civil regulatory agencies cannot bring criminal charges, they are
empowered to compel individuals and organizations to produce
documents and appear for testimony under oath.8
6. See John F. Walsh, Practical Considerations in Federal Grand Jury Practice, in
FEDERALCRIMINALLIIGATION 1, 2 (Barbara A. Reeves et al. eds., 1994) ("Over the past
twenty years, the increasing emphasis of the United States Department ofJustice on the
investigation andprosecution ofwhite-collarcrime has caused grandjurypractice in the
federal courts to expand exponentially.").
7. See 28 U.S. C. § 515 (1996); United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th
Cir. 1999) ("Only officers of the Department of Justice or the United States Attorney can
represent the United States in the prosecution of a criminal case.").
8. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1994) (authorizing the Securities and Exchange
Commission to "subpena [sic] witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, and
require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, or other
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The dual nature of many regulatory provisions means that a
course of conduct may be subject to investigation by both the
civil and criminal authorities. It is quite common for the
regulatory agency to conduct a preliminary investigation of the
conduct because it has greater expertise in the area and will
often receive the information from regulated entities regarding
possible wrongdoing at an early stage. In the course of that
investigation, the agency staff can refer the matter to the
criminal authorities if it appears that there is a possible criminal
violation. At that point, the civil agency's investigation need not
stop, and the two cases can proceed in tandem, hence a parallel
proceeding. These types of parallel investigations are
particularly common in cases involving banking, securities and
commodities trading, antitrust, and environmental violations.
The possibility of parallel civil and criminal investigations by
different arms of the federal government does not exhaust the
possibilities of multiple proceedings involving the same
underlying conduct. There may be state license revocation
proceedings for professionals, shareholder suits for public
corporations, disbarment from federal programs, and, the
current vogue, qui tam and whistleblower actions.' The
combinations are almost endless, so that an individual or
organization may be dragged into a number of different venues
and called upon to defend itself."0
The effect of these prolferating proceedings is that
documents relevant to the criminal prosecution may be housed
in a number of locations and held by self-regulatory
organizations or agencies at different levels of government. In
many instances, a regulatory agency or executive department
develops evidence of possible criminal conduct that it refers to
the prosecutor to determine whether criminal charges should be
filed. But even without a formal referral, prosecutors can seek
records which the Commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry").
9. SeeF. Whitten Peters, ParallelProceedings, inFEDERALCRMINALLrI GATION 149
(Barbara A. Reeves et al. eds., 1994) ("Acompany maybe simultaneously threatened, for
example, with a congressional investigation, criminal charges, suspension from federal
or state contracting, civil fraud, qui tam or false claims actions, and shareholders'
derivative suits.").
10. ThisArticle does not dealwiththe issue ofthe FifthAmendmentprivilege against
self-incrimination inparallelproceedings,whichis thoroughlydiscussed elsewhere. See
generaflyGraham Hughes,Administrative Subpoenasand the Grand Jury: Converging
Streams of Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573 (1994).
605
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:601
information from other arms of the government to assess
whether to pursue the criminal case, relying on the expertise of
an agency's staff to ascertain the nature and effect of conduct.
While the regulators provide valuable information and
expertise, a prosecutor may not be aware of all the documents
held by agencies and other regulatory organizations that relate
to the potential criminal activity.
It is not just other offices of the government that may have
relevant materials. White collar crimes often involve economic
transactions that involve third parties, such as banks, brokerage
firms, suppliers, and insurance companies. Misconduct by an
employee may be investigated by the organization first to
determine the scope of the activity and the company's potential
criminal and civil exposure." The federal Sentencing
Guidelines create a powerful incentive for organizations to
cooperate with the government by alerting it to misconduct by
employees. Whether or not the organization is involved in the
conduct, it can have valuable information regarding the
defendant's activities.
II. DISCOVERY IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
The Government's principal means of gathering evidence in
a white collar crime investigation is the grand jury.2 Under the
direction of the prosecutor, the grand jury can subpoena records
and compel individuals to testify in a proceeding in which the
witness may not have an attorney present. The grand jury's
authority in federal cases is quite broad, being entitled to "every
11. See In r Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988) (ordering disclosure
internal audit for the prosecution of former employee for fraud based on allegedly false
invoices submitted for reimbursement).
12. The government can also obtain a warrant to search for and seize records, a tactic
that has been used with greater frequency of late. The problem with the search warrant,
as opposed to a grand jury subpoena, is that the prosecutor must make a preliminary
showing of the need for the documents before the warrant issues. SeePeter J. Henning,
Testing the Limits of nvestiga ting and Pmosecuting White Collar Crime: How Far Will
the Courts Allow Prsecutors to Go, 54 U. PITr. L. REv. 405, 414 (1993) ("Search
warrants are generally a less appealing means to obtain documents because of the
greater burden placed on the prosecution, although when there is a threat that
documents may be destroyed or tampered with, the warrant is an effective means of
seizing evidence before it loses its probative value.").
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man's evidence,"'3 and it may investigate "merely on suspicion
that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants
assurance that it is not."'4 Once the prosecutor decides to
proceed with the case, the grand jury must find that there is
probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime to
hand up an indictment. At that point, the Government will, in
all likelihood, have the evidence required to go forward, with
little need for additional discovery of documents. Moreover, if
the Government learns of additional criminal activity by the
defendant, even conduct that may be arguably related to the
underlying charges, it may continue to use the grand jury to
investigate the newly discovered criminal conduct." The grand
jury is a powerful engine of discovery for the Government, with
no comparable method for gathering evidence available to the
defendant.
Unlike the Government's authority to conduct a "grand
inquest,"'6 the Supreme Court has stated quite clearly that
criminal defendants have no constitutional right to discovery. 7
Aside from what defendants can gather through their own
efforts, until the Government files charges, there is no means
for defendants to compel the production of evidence or
information. Once charged with a crime, the Supreme Court
recognized in Brady v. Maryland8 that due process requires the
Government to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal
defendant, so long as the information is material to guilt or
punishment. 9 Although Brady is not technically a discovery
case, the effect of the Court's decision compels prosecutors to
turn over evidence that they might not have disclosed otherwise
under statutory provisions providing limited discovery rights to
13. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,688 (1972) (citations omitted).
14. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,642-43 (1950).
15. See United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 351-52 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
prosecution may use evidence obtained by a post-indictment grand jury subpoena if the
dominant purpose for the grand jury subpoena was investigating crimes other than
those indicted); United States v. Breitkreutz, 977 F.2d 214, 217 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding
that a grandjury may hearincriminatingtestimony afterindictment if defendant cannot
show that dominant purpose of the grand jurywas not to gather evidence for use in the
prosecution).
16. See Costello v. United States. 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
17. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,559 (1977).
18. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
19. See id. at 87.
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defendants. The combination of constitutional and statutory
discovery rights provides a defendant with four means of
obtaining evidence from the prosecutor: (1) Bradyrequests for
exculpatory evidence; (2) Production of witness statements after
the person testifies, pursuant to the requirements of the Jencks
Act;2" (3) Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
governing disclosure of information by the Government and
defendants; and (4) The Freedom of Information Act.21 In
addition, a defendant can also seek information regarding the
charges by moving for a bill of particulars,22 but courts often
deny such motions when their purpose is to gain discovery
outside of the avenues provided by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.'
The starting point for all discovery in a criminal case is with
the prosecutor's office. To the extent the Government has
documents it intends to use at trial, it must afford the defendant
complete access to those records.24 The harder issue is whether
the discovery rules permit a defendant to gain access to
documents that the prosecutor does not intend to use to
establish the defendant's guilt, and whether a defendant can
obtain documents outside the direct control of the prosecutor.
Documents in the latter category may be in the hands of
another agency of the government, or held by third parties.
Defending a white collar case requires access to more than just
what the prosecutor gathers in an investigation and decides to
use at trial, because what may be relevant to the grand jury's
probable cause determination and proof of guilt may not
encompass the documents needed to mount a credible defense.
The government is not necessarily the sole repository of
relevant documents, so the scope of permissible discovery
should extend beyond just documents in the prosecutor's office.
For example, a state licensing agency's investigation of the
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994); seealsoEllen S. Podgor, CriminalDiscoveiyofJencks
Witness Statements: TimingMakes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (1999).
21. See5 U.S.c. § 552 (1994).
22. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(f).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Fleming, 8 F.3d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining
that to establish reversible error from "denial of a motion for a bill of particulars,
defendant must show that he was actually surprised at trial"); United States v. Perkins,
994 F.2d 1184, 1190-91 (6th Cir. 1993).
24. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(c).
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defendant may involve a large volume of documents that might
be relevant to a criminal prosecution by federal authorities
arising from the same conduct. Similarly, civil litigation or a
bankruptcy proceeding might generate a large cache of records
and, equally important, statements by the defendant and other
witnesses. Financial records held by banks, claims for
reimbursement submitted to insurance companies, and audit
reports by accountants often provide crucial evidence for a
defendant regarding the flow of funds and a course of
performance. Third parties may have records about which the
prosecutor is completely unaware or that the Government
reviewed but did not consider relevant to its investigation. The
records may shed light on whether a defendant's conduct
conformed to industry standards, or otherwise was not unusual
or questionable.25 Unlike a street crime investigation, in which
forensic issues regarding the physical evidence and the
witnesses' statements to investigators are the primary evidence,
in a white collar case there may be documents potentially
relevant to the case that the prosecutor may not possess or even
know exist.2
6
The defendant's discovery of documents in a white collar case
entails a two-step process. The first is ascertaining what records
the Government gathered in its investigation to determine
whether they are relevant to the defense. The principle vehicle
for this type of discovery is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(a)(1)(C), which gives each side access to documents and
tangible objects in the possession of the other party if the
documents meet certain requirements.2 7 The second step is
gathering information from third parties, which may include
government agencies that would not come within the discovery
25. See United States v. Caruso, 948 F. Supp. 382, 396-97 (D.N.J. 1996) (enforcing
subpoena duces tecum to former employer for records of firm's internal policies to
determine whether employer permitted unwritten deviations from policy); cf Stephen
V. Wilson & A- Howard Matz, Obtaining Evidence for Federal Economic Crime
Prosecutions:An OveiviewandAnalysis ofInvestigativeMethods, 14 Am. CRIM. L.REv.
651,651(1977) (explaining that "[tlhe 'proof consists not merely of relatively few items
of real evidence but of a large roomful of often obscure documents").
26. See Henning, supra note 12, at 408 (explaining that "[t]he investigations [of a
white collar crime] require access to documents that detail the conduct of the
transactions, especially the flow of funds and timing of decisions, and the statements
of participants, both innocent and suspect, about the process of events").
27. SeeFED. R. CPmx. P. 16(g)(l)(C).
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requirements of Rule 16(a)(1)(C). The manner for gathering
evidence from this source is a subpoena duces tecum issued by
the defendant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c).28
At this point, the weakness of the federal rules in providing
adequate discovery of documents in a white collar case becomes
apparent. The Supreme Court stated in Bowman Dairy Co. v.
United States,2' and reiterated in United States v. Nixon,0 that
Rule 17(c) is not a discovery rule that supplants the limitations
of Rule 16(a)(1)(C) by giving defendants some broad right to
subpoena documents."' Lower courts applying the Supreme
Court's overly broad statements regarding the scope of Rule
17(c) virtually eliminate defense subpoenas as a means to gather
documents. The problem is that the courts misunderstand the
context in which Bowman Dairy and Nixon construed Rule
17(c). Properly understood, Rule 17(c) furnishes an important
adjunct to the more familiar discovery procedure in Rule
16(a)(1)(C) that should permit defendants to obtain records from
third parties, including government agencies, if defendants can
show a sufficient need for them.
III. DIscovERY OF DOCUMENTS FROM THE
GOVERNMENT: RULE 16(a)(1)(C)
The starting point for any consideration of discovery in a
criminal case is the Supreme Court's admonition that there is
no constitutional mandate that the Government provide
discovery to the defendant.2 While the Court required
disclosure of material exculpatory evidence under Brady, and
condemned the introduction of false evidence as a violation of
due process,33 it has not recognized an independent right to
demand that the Government produce evidence or information
28. See id. at 17(c).
29. 341 U.S. 214 (1951).
30. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
31. Bowman, 341 U.S. at 220; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 698.
32. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,559 (1977).
33. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (reversing conviction when prosecutor
did not correct key witness's false testimony that government had not made any
promise of leniency in exchange for testimony); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112
(1935) (holding that due process would be violated "through the pretense of a trial which
in truth is butused as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be peijured").
610
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that it gathered in its investigation. Moreover, the Court reads
the Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and
confrontation narrowly, rejecting an interpretation of those
provisions as requiring the Government to provide discovery to
the defendant.34
Absent any constitutional mandate, discovery rights depend
on what the legislature is willing to provide. In 1944, the
Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which, for the first time in the federal system,
provided concrete discovery guidelines outlining what the
Government must afford a criminal defendant.35 Rule 16
provides defendants with discovery of any statements they
made, copies of their criminal record, the results of
examinations or tests, and a summary of the testimony of any
expert the Government intends to call at trial.36 In addition, the
current form of Rule 16(a)(1)(C) provides for discovery of three
categories of documents in the "possession, custody or control
of the government"37: (1) records intended for use in the
prosecution's case in chief;38 (2) items obtained from or
belonging to the defendant;39 and (3) documents that are
"material to the preparation of the defendant's defense.' 40
34. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Court held that a defendant's
confrontation right could not be read to require the government to produce evidence
with which a witness could be effectively cross-examined because "the effect would be
to transform the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial
discovery. Nothing in the case law supports such a view." Pennsylvania, 480 U.S. at 52.
The court in Ritchie found that the analysis of the Compulsory Process Clause was
"unsettled," and opted to apply the Bradydue process analysis to a claim regarding the
government's failure to produce records. Id. at 56.
35. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, some lower
courts took a restrictive approach, using language that cast doubt on whether there was
any discovery right in a criminal case. SeeUnited States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.
1932); United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1).
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Id.; seeid. at 16(a)(1)(C).
Upon request of the defendant, the government shall permit the defendant
to inspect and copy orphotographbooks, papers, documents, photographs,
tangible objects,buildings orplaces, orcopies orportionsthereofwhich are
within the possession, custody or control of the government, which are
within the possession, custody, or control of the government, andwhich are
material to the preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended for
use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained for
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A. Possession, Custody, and Control of the Government
"Discovery" for the purposes of a criminal prosecution is
much more limited than in a civil proceeding.4 Discovery of
documents under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) does not reach documents
held by nonparties except insofar as the Government might
have gathered material from them for use in its investigation.
On the other hand, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, "A
person not a party to the action may be compelled to produce
documents and things or to submit to an inspection .... "" In a
criminal case, the only source of documents explicitly referred
to in the Rule is the government, so that a defendant must look
to the prosecutor as the first source of documents in evaluating
the case and building a defense.44
Although Rule 16(a)(1)(C) imposes the disclosure duty only on
the parties to the proceeding, it does not explain what is
comprehended within the term "government"; i.e., what offices
are subject to the discovery requirements.45 With a burgeoning
bureaucracy that includes agencies with overlapping
jurisdiction and different layers of government with the
authority to regulate the same conduct, it should not be
surprising that officials sometimes compete for cases rather
than cooperate in an investigation and adjudication. The
government is not one big, happy family, even though the
different departments may be arms of the same sovereign.
Moreover, to the extent that an administrative agency
cooperates with a prosecutor, the prosecutor may review only a
or belong to the defendant.
Id. Rule 16(b)(1)(A)provides forreciprocaldisclosurebythe defendant ofdocuments the
defense intends to use in its case in chief once it makes a request to the government
under Rule 16(a)(1)(C). Seeid. at 16(b)(1)(A).
41. SeeJACKH. FRIEDENTHALETAI., CIVaPROCEDURE § 7.2 (2d ed. 1993) ("The scope
of discovery is extremely broad under the Federal Rules and comparable state practice.
Information can be obtained regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action, whether or not the information sought will be
admissible at trial, just so long as it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.").
42. SeeFED. R. CEIM. P. 16(a)(1)(c).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c). Rule 34(c) was added in 1991, and the broad grant of authority
in civil cases to compel non-parties to produce records is subject to the limitations of
Rule 45, which permits a non-party to object to the subpoena. See FED. R. CiV. P. 45(c).
44. FED.R.CIv.P. 16.
45. Seeid. at 16(a)(1)(C).
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portion of the information gathered by the regulatory body,
selecting what is most appealing or apparently criminal. Even
assuming one agency has all the relevant documents, the
prosecutor need not take actual possession of the records, nor be
aware of their contents.
Is the "government" equivalent to just the prosecutor's office?
The answer is no, but it is not clear which other offices are
subject to Rule 16(a)(1)(C). Determining what constitutes the
government under the Rule is complicated by the disclosure
duty imposed under Brady which has a similar requirement
that exculpatory information in the possession of the
government be disclosed to the defendant. Bradyand Rule 16
deal with different phases of a criminal proceeding: Bradyis a
post-trial assessment of whether the prosecutor's suppression
of evidence resulted in prejudice to the defendant,46 while Rule
16 regulates the pre-trialproduction of evidence without judicial
involvement in triggering the duty to disclose evidence.47 Yet,
defendants often make a single motion before trial for the
production of records under both Rule 16 and Brady.48
Possession by the government is a condition for both
requirements, so courts often follow the defendant's lead by
treating the issues identically in determining whether the
prosecutor must disclose evidence because it is either
exculpatory information or subject to discovery.
Bradyand Rule 16 are not, however, identical, so it is not clear
that their use of similar terms should result in the same
analysis. As the Supreme Court points outwith some regularity,
Brady is not a rule of discovery, but one of fairness.49 Under
Brady, the Government's failure to disclose exculpatory
46. Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936,1948 (1999).
47. FED. R. CRnmi. P. 16.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1208 (8th Cir. 1994) (moving for
disclosure of information from the INS under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) and Brady); United States
v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that in a mail and tax fraud
prosecution, defendant "grounded his motion both on Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 and Brady v. Maryland'); United States v. Uphoff, 907 F. Supp. 1475,1477
(D. Kan. 1995) ("Defendant claims that Brady... and Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16, authorize his discovery requests."); United States v. NYNEX Corp., 781
F. Supp. 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1991) (moving for production of records under both Rule
16(a)(1)(C) and Brady by a defendant corporation).
49. SeeKyles v.Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,491 (1995); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39,
59 (1987); Str'ckler, 119 S. Ct. at 1948; see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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evidence is a due process violation if the defendant is unaware
of the evidence until after trial. " If the Government discloses
exculpatory information in time for the defendant to use it at
trial, then there is no constitutional violation.5' Rule 16, on the
other hand, is designed to be a rule of discovery-hence the
title-so the more restrictive interpretation of the requirements
for a due process violation should not necessarily carry over to
interpreting the same terms in the discovery rule."
In United States v. Bryan,3 the Government argued that its
disclosure obligation only reached documents within the
possession of the prosecutor in the district in which it
prosecuted the defendant and did not cover documents in the
possession of other agencies that were not physically present in
the district.' The Ninth Circuit rejected such a narrow reading
of "government," holding that "[tlhe prosecutor will be deemed
to have knowledge of and access to anything in the possession,
custody or control of any federal agency participating in the
same investigation of the defendant."5 On the other hand,
prosecutors do not "have constructive knowledge of every fact
or piece of information known to any other part of the federal or
state government.""5 In United States v. Moris,7 the Seventh
Circuit held that information held by other government
agencies that are not part of the prosecution "team" was not in
the possession of the prosecutor for Bradypurposes." The Ninth
Circuit's test is potentially broader, because agencies
50. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 83.
51. Cf d. at 84-85.
52. FED. R. CEIM. P. 16.
53. 868 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1989).
54. See id. at 1034-35.
55. Id. at 1036. The defendant sought records related to a broad investigation of his
activities by the Internal Revenue Service to support his defense that he acted in good
faith. See id. at 1033-34. While the Ninth Circuit's statement ostensibly defined
"government" under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), the court then consideredwhether the documents
were material under Brady. See id. at 1036-38. Bryan's approach is typical of many
courts and practitioners who treat Brady and Rule 16 as interchangeable means to
engage in pre-trial discovery.
56. United States v. Coleman, 11 F. Supp. 2d 689,692 (W.D. Va. 1998).
57. 80 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1996).
58. See id. at 1169 ("Because none of those agencies were part of the team that
investigated this case or participated in its prosecution, the district court would not
impute their knowledge of potentially exculpatory information to the present
prosecutors.").
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"consulted" by the prosecutor are part of the government under
Brady
59
In reality, courts undertaking the Bradyanalysis engage in a
fact-specific analysis that asks whether the prosecutor's
ignorance is both plausible and an acceptable result in light of
a sprawling government that cannot always be considered a
unitary entity, lest every case involve a government-wide search
for evidence favorable to the accused. The courts occasionally
rely on mixed metaphors in characterizing the prosecutor's
ignorance as unacceptable, noting for example that "[t]he
government cannot with its right hand say it has nothing while
its left hand holds what is of value,"'60 or that the "failure to turn
over an easily turned rock is essentially as offensive as one
based on government non-disclosure."'" Pithy phrases aside, the
functional approach adopted by courts makes it imperative that
defendants first try to define "government" expansively,
thereby triggering the Brady protection beyond just the
prosecutor's office. In this regard, courts have found in federal
prosecutions that the "government" includes local law
enforcement offices, 2 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and the National Crime Information Center,63 the United States
Postal Service,' the Internal Revenue Service," the Food and
Drug Administration,66 and a state environmental testing
laboratory.6" Similarly, a state court found that the local
59. See United States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[Under Bradythe
agency charged with administration of the statute, which has consulted with the
prosecutor in the steps leading to prosecution, is to be considered as part of the
prosecution in determining what information must be made available to the defendant
charged with violation of the statute.").
60. Id. at 737 (citing United States v Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 1989)).
61. United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
62. See id. (relating to Washington, D.C., metropolitan police records); United States
v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967,970-71 (3d Cir. 1991) (relating to local Virgin Islands criminal
records).
63. See United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478,481 (5th Cir 1980).
64. SeeUnited States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55,56 (5th Cir. 1973), overruled byUnited
States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984).
65. See United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1989).
66. See United States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733,737 (9th Cir. 1995).
67. United States v. Liquid Sugars, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 466, 474-75 (E.D. Ca. 1994).
Agencies that courts found were not, under the circumstances of the particular cases,
sufficiently affiliated with the prosecution to impose the Bradydisclosure requirement
include the Federal Communications Conmissionin UnitedStates v.N1YNECorp., 781
F. Supp. 19, 25 (D.D.C. 1991), and the Office of Thrift Supervision, Securities &
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prosecutor needed to at least attempt to secure exculpatory
information from the FBI.68
Does "government" mean the same thing under Brady and
Rule 16(a)(1)(C)? The answer should be no, despite the fact that
defendants and courts sometimes treat them as equivalent
means to the same end, and, therefore, subject to the same
interpretation. As the Sixth Circuit noted in considering a
defendant's Bradyclaim, "the disclosure required by Rule 16 is
much broader than that required by the due process standards
of Brady."69 One reason is that Brady's concern is with
suppression of evidence by the prosecutor, so it is logical to
focus on what the prosecutor knows or should know that might
impact on the fairness of the trial. Rule 16 permits discovery, so
its use of the term "government" should not follow slavishly the
analysis of Bradycases. The Advisory Committee Notes to the
1974 amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
refer to the Committee's decision not to codify Brady in Rule
16(a)(1)(C), which indicates that the Rule is broader than the due
process requirement imposed on prosecutors and not the entire
government."'
Some courts view of the obligation to produce documents
under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) as broader than the Brady disclosure
duty. In United States v. Skeddle,7 a district court ordered the
Government to try to obtain documents from a corporation that
had provided them pursuant to a grand jury subpoena and to
whom the Government returned the records.7 2 The court held
that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) is designed to assure adequate discovery to
the defendant, including records that the Government can
reasonably obtain from a third party. 3 In United States v.
Klroy,'4 the district court stated that "it is not unreasonable to
treat the records as being within the Government's control at
least to the extent of requiring the Government to request the
Exchange Commission, and the IRS in United States v. Molris, 80 F.3d 1151,1169 (7th
Cir. 1996).
68. See Commonwealth v. Donahue, 487 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Mass. 1980).
69. United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 911 (6th Cir. 1970).
70. See FED. R. CRlL P. 16 advisory committee notes to 1974 Amendment.
71. 176 F.R.D. 258 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
72. Seeid. at 259.
73. Seeid. at 262.
74. 523 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
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records on the defendant's behalf andto include them in its files
for the defendant's review .... " The Ninth Circuit, however,
took a more narrow approach in United States v. Gatto,7
6
holding that "the triggering requirement under rule 16(a)(1)(C)
is that the papers, documents, and tangible objects be in the
actual possession, custody, or control of the government. Here,
they were not.' 77
The rationale for limiting Brady's disclosure requirement to
the prosecutor's office and those closely allied with the
investigation is that imposing a broad search duty on other
government agencies would be disruptive to their operations
without much benefit to ensuring the fairness of the trial. What
is subject to Brady, however, is any type of exculpatory
information, not just documents or other tangible items
described in Rule 16(a)(1)(C). Brady material can be anything
from a formal memorandum to a conversation never
memorialized in writing. Compelling a search for any type of
exculpatory information may impose an unfair burden on the
Government, but requiring a search for documents that the
defendant must describe in sufficient detail to demonstrate
their materiality would impose a lesser burden on the
Government. "Government" under Rule 16 should entail more
than just the prosecutor's office and those closely alliedwith the
criminal investigation. It is no significant burden to require
agencies that hold documents relevant to the case to determine
whether they must be produced under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) because
the defendant must provide a clear description of them in the
request for discovery of material information that will guide the
agency's search; a defendant cannot simply demand all
"exculpatory evidence" or "all documents relating to the
investigation." Moreover, because Rule 16(a)(1)(C) places the
burden on the defendant to describe the items sought and
75. Id. at 215.
76. 763 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 1049. The documents at issue were held by state investigators, and the
prosecutor was unaware of their existence until shortly before trial. Seeid. at 1047. In
dissent, Circuit Judge Schroeder argued that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) "is' not limited to
documents physically resting in federal agency file folders and should reach at least far
enough to encompass these documents, which were at the prosecutors' fingertips." Id.
at 1051 (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting); see alsoUnited States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d
1368, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) ("IT]he federal government had no duty to obtain from state
officials documents of which it was aware but over which it had no actual control.").
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demonstrate their materiality, it is unlikely that the type of
broad "fishing expedition" that courts abhor would be
permissible under an expanded definition of government. The
operative threshold showing for discovery remains unaltered.
At a minimum, Rule 16(a)(1)(C) cannot be read to mean that
only the prosecutor's office must comply with a discovery
request.78 To the extent a prosecutor should have to review the
information held by another arm of the government under
Brady, so too would Rule 16(a)(1)(C) apply to any documents
held by that agency. But, Rule 16(a)(1)(C) should not be
understood as merely adopting Brady as applied to document
discovery before trial. There is no basis in the language of the
Rule to find that it only implements Bradys due process
requirements. Rule 16 is a mandate to provide discovery, which
Bradysurely is not. The more limited scope of what is subject to
discovery under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), i.e. documents and tangible
objects, argues in favor of a broader reading of "government"
because there is much less danger that government offices will
have to conduct burdensome searches of their records to find an
elusive piece of ill-defined evidence that may be exculpatory.
Rule 16 mandates discovery, so it is counterintuitive to adopt an
narrow construction of government in Rule 16(a)(1)(C) to
thereby limit discovery on the ground that a broader definition
would impose a burden on the Government. The Rule is
designed to require the Government to search its files.
B. Matezial to the Defense
Rule 16(a)(1)(C) permits discovery of documents that are
"material to the preparation of the defendant's defense 79 even
if the prosecution does not intend to use them in its case in
chief. The rationale for allowing discovery of this category of
records tracks the constitutional analysis of Brady, that a
defendant be accorded the opportunity to put on a defense to
the Government's charges by using the product of the
Government's investigation if it is helpful to rebutting the
78. But see Gatto, 763 F.2d at 1048 ("Because we find no due diligence language in
rule 16(a)(1)(C) at all, nor any special reason to deviate from its plain language, we
conclude that it triggers the government's disclosure obligation only with respect to
documents within the federal government's actual possession, custody, or control.").
79. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
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charges." Brady and Rule 16(a)(1)(C) use the identical term
"material" to describe one attribute of the evidence that the
Government must disclose to the defendant, raising a similar
question: Does "material" mean the same thing under both
requirements to produce information to the defendant?
The answer this time is even more emphatically that they are
not, because the difference between the post-trial due process
analysis and the Rule's requirement of adequate disclosure
before trial make the standard for what is "material"
significantly different. While Bradyrequires a hindsight review
of whether the failure to disclose evidence prejudiced the
defendant,"' Rule 16(a)(1)(C) mandates disclosure of items
helpful to the defense while the defendant prepares for trial. "
Yet, some courts do not appreciate the difference between the
two, applying the stricter due process analysis to discovery
claims under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), thereby imposing an
unnecessarily high standard that thwarts the Rule rather than
comports with the goal of enhancing the fairness of the
proceeding through discovery."
This result is not surprising, given the tendency of defense
counsel to mix the distinct analyses together by submitting
pretrial motions treating them as two sides of the same
discovery coin. Applying a "pasta theory" of discovery, i.e.,
throwing out to the court as many potential grounds for
discovery as possible to see what will stick, clouds rather than
clarifies the discovery issue. Bradyand Rule 16(a)(1)(C) are quite
different, and treating them as essentially identical methods of
discovery opens the way for courts to adopt the more stringent
Bradyanalysis of materiality as the proper standard for judging
a Rule 16(a)(1)(C) request for documents.
The starting point for understanding what documents a
defendant can obtain through discovery requires determining
80. See FED. R. CRM. P. 16 advisory committee notes to 1974 Amendment ("Mhe
requirement that the government disclose documents and tangible objects 'material to
the preparation of his defense' underscores the importance of disclosure of evidence
favorable to the defendant.").
81. Striclderv. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936,1948 (1999) ("[S]trictly speaking, there is never
a real'Bradyviolation' unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable
probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.").
82. FED. R. CRn. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 1975); see also infra
notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
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what constitutes a "defense" forthe purposes of Rule 16(a)(1)(C).
In United States v. Armstrong," the Court stated that Rule
16(a)(1)(C) limits discovery to documents related to defenses to
the Government's case in chief.85 The Court distinguished
defenses that are a " 'sword,' challenging the prosecution's
conduct of the case," such as the selective prosecution claim at
issue in Aimstrong, from a "shield" that responds to the
Government's proof of a violation." Rule 16(a)(1)(C) provides for
automatic disclosure of documents the Government will use in
its case in chief, so a demand for additional.records will require
that the defendant identify the defense to which the discovery
relates. The burden is on the defendant, therefore, to make a
sufficient showing that the discovery will assist their defense.
At this point, the meaning of "material" under the Rule
becomes crucial because that will define how great a showing
the defendant must make to establish a right to discovery of
documents beyond those the Government intends to use to
establish guilt. The higher the threshold, the more the
defendant will have to reveal about the expected defense, and
the greater the difficulty in establishing the need for the
documents. Requiring increased disclosure about the defense
to ensure it is a "shield" gives the Government a preview of the
defendant's strategy, raising the ante for a defendant deciding
whether to pursue discovery of other records held by the
Government. Rule 16(a)(1)(C) does not define materiality, so its
use of the same term as Bradyto delineate the Government's
disclosure obligation engenders the same type of confusion
encountered in determining what constitutes the government.
84. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
85. Seeid.at462.
86. Id. at 550-54. The Court did not explain what other defenses constitute a "sword"
rather than a "shield." For example, an entrapment defense concedes the elements of
the crime, including intent, but asserts that the defendant was not predisposed to
commit the crime absent the government's enticement. SeeJacobson v. United States,
503 U.S. 540, 548-59 (1992). Entrapment could be viewed as a "sword" attacking the
government's conduct in investigating the case, or a "shield" that disputes whether the
defendant had the requisite intent to be held responsible for the criminal conduct. See
id. The Court maybe distinguishing between defenses that are decided by the court and
not the jury, in which case entrapment would be a shield because it is an issue for the
jury. Defenses that focus on the conduct and motives of the prosecutor or investigator,
such as a vindictive prosecution claim or that the government violated the defendant's
due process rights by its outrageous conduct, are decided by the judge and more likely
to be viewed as swords in the hands of a defendant.
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The effect of transporting the Brady analysis of materiality to
Rule 16 has an even great detrimental effect on the scope of
discovery.
In United States v. Bagley," the Supreme Court held that
"evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different."88 The Brady
standard is quite high, requiring a defendant to show that, due
to the suppression of exculpatory evidence, the result of the trial
is open to sufficient doubt that the verdict was not reliable,
thereby denying the essential requirement of due process that
a defendant only be convicted after a fair proceeding. The Court
has chosen a high threshold for a Bradyviolation requiring a
defendant to show that the withheld evidence would have had
a significant impact on the outcome, rather than an easier
standard that asks whether the suppressed evidence "could
have" affected the outcome.8 9
The procedural posture of a Brady claim is crucial to
understanding why the Court hews to a high standard for
assessing a due process claim arising from the Government's
suppression of exculpatory evidence. The due process claim
involves post-trial review of a guilty verdict, so the entire body
of evidence is available for a court to assess, including the
evidence withheld by the prosecutor. The court can weigh the
effect of a piece of evidence on the entire process, and consider
at the same time the cost of requiring a new trial when the
evidence was unlikely to have a significant effect on the
proceeding."0 Brady is a balancing test, factoring in whether
undisclosed evidence raises enough of a question that, on the
whole, there is sufficient doubt about the validity of the guilty
87. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
88. Id. at 682. The Court defined a reasonable probability as" 'a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.' "Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984)).
89. See Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1953 (1999) (distinguishing "reasonable
probability" standard from the lower "reasonable possibility" threshold to establish the
materiality of the suppression of exculpatory evidence).
90. See id. at 1954. In Stricker, the Court found that the State's suppression of
information that would have impeached a prosecution witness did not violate Brady
because the weight of the prosecution's other evidence demonstrated that the trial
resulted in a reliable verdict of guilt. See id.
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verdict to require a new trial.9 Under Brady, a reviewing court
does not ask whether suppressed evidence would be helpful or
important to the defendant; it assumes that it was. Rather, the
due process analysis entails a review of the entire trial. As the
Third Circuit noted, "To constitute a Brady violation, the
nondisclosure must do more than impede the defendant's
ability to prepare for trial; it must adversely affect the court's
ability to reach a just conclusion, to the prejudice of the
defendant."92
Discovery is fundamentally different from determining
whether exculpatory evidence was material to the outcome of a
trial because discovery is a pre-tial procedure designed to
secure items that will assist the defendant in crafting a defense.
While Bradydeals with the effect of a suppression of evidence
on the outcome of the proceeding,93 a trial court considering a
discovery request under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) should look at whether
the records will be helpful to the defendant.' Viewed in context,
the materiality requirement should not require the same high
threshold for a discovery request as required to prove a due
process violation. Perhaps the most fundamental "shield" a
defendant can assert is disputing whether the Government
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the basic
requirement for all criminal trials. In order to contest the
Government's case, a defendant needs to assess the strength of
the evidence against him or her and whether other evidence the
Government does not intend to introduce negates its proof of
the elements of the crime. Discovery can aid in raising that
defense to the charges, yet transporting Brady's materiality
91. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
92. United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256,262 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing United States v.
Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1979)). An important difference between
Bradyand Rule 16 is the sanction available for a violation. The discovery rule permits
the court to, fnteralia, restrict the use of evidence or prohibit a party from introducing
it, while a due process violation requires a new trial and not a lesser remedial sanction.
See United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1286 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he remedy for a
Bradyviolation is a new trial and that... remedy is available to a defendant only after
a first trial has ended in a conviction .... We find no support in any decision construing
the Bradydoctrine for the proposition that a trial judge can threaten to refuse to let a
government witness testify in order to sanction noncompliance with the Bmdydoctrine
which comes to light before or during trial.").
93. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 83.
94. FED. R. Cium. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
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standard to the pre-trial stage would make discovery contingent
on showing that the defendant will come close to winning the
case. At the discovery phase of a case, the defendant does not
have the evidence but is seeking access to it, so a court cannot
make the kind of post-hoc assessment of the discovery motion
that it does in reviewing a Bradyclaim.
Given the distinct procedural contexts of Brady and Rule
16(a)(1)(C), courts should not easily confuse the standards for
materiality. Yet, the similarities between Brady and discovery
can overwhelm the differences, so that some courts apply what
is essentially the due process standard of materiality to
assessment of a defendant's request for discovery under Rule
16(a)(1)(C). The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Ross,95 appears
to be the first court to adopt a high threshold that parallels the
Brady standard for determining whether the defendant
demonstrated the materiality of documents to trigger the
discovery right.96 In Ross, the court stated: "Materiality means
more than that the evidence in question bears some abstract
logical relationship to the issues in the case.... There must be
some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the disputed
evidence would have enabled the defendant significantly to
alter the quantum ofproofin his favor.,17 Ross did not cite any
precedent for its assertion, and the language is similar to
Bradys requirement that the defendant demonstrate that the
suppressed evidence affected the fairness of the proceeding.98
The problem with the Ross standard is that it bears no relation
to the concept of pre-trial discovery. Documents in the
Government's possession that would significantly alter the
quantum of proof in a defendant's favor are most likely Brady
material, yet Rule 16(a)(1)(C) is not simply the embodiment of
the due process standard.99
The Fifth Circuit's description of the materiality standard
under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) might be understandable if it were
limited to the post-trial review of a defendant's claim that the
95. 511 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1975).
96. Seeid.at 763.
97. Id. at 762-63 (emphasis added).
98. Seeid.
99. See United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1208 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding denial of
documents under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) and Brady due to lack of materiality without
distinguishing the two approaches).
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erroneous denial of discovery requires a new trial. In that
context, a court must apply the harmless error rule in Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) to determine whether to grant
a remedy, so that asking whether the withheld evidence would
have impacted significantly the outcome at trial is another way
of determining whether the error was harmless. Courts citing
Ross, however, have neither confined it to that particular
procedural context, nor noted that it is a type of harmless error
analysis.' Moreover, trial courts have relied erroneously on
Ross' formulation of the materiality standard to deny pre-trial
motions for discovery under Rule 16(a)(1)(C).''
The proper analysis of materiality requires that the court
remain cognizant of the pre-trial context in which discovery
takes place. Rule 16(a)(1)(C) provides an important aid to the
defendant's preparation for trial. The Rule is not a means to
protect the Government from having to review files for
documents that the prosecutor considers so unimportant that
they were not included in the Government's case in chief.02 In
United States v. LiquidSugars, Inc.,"3 a district court suggested
a lower threshold for establishing materiality under the Rule "as
that information, not otherwise provided for or precluded by
discovery rules, which is significantly helpful to an
understanding of important inculpatory or exculpatory
evidence."' °4 The court noted that "[d]efendants have a right to
analyze and prepare for facially damning evidence," and
lamented that "there is entirely too much 'hide-the-ball' in
criminal discovery with respect to easily producible
documents."'0 5
Unlike Brady's materiality requirement for a due process
violation, the language of Rule 16(a)(1)(C) should not be read to
100. See, e.g., United States v. Maniktala, 934 F.2d 25,28 (2d Cir. 1991); United States
v. Reeves, 892 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1990).
101. SeeUnited States v. Uphoff, 907 F. Supp. 1475,1480 (D. Kan. 1995); United States
v. Burger, 773 F. Supp. 1419, 1424 (D. Kan. 1991); United States v. McGuinness, 704 F.
Supp. 888, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
102. See United States v. McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441, 1450 (D. Colo. 1997) ("The
government has objected to some of Mr. McVeigh's requests as 'burdensome.' That is
not a proper objection.").
103. 158 F.R.D. 466 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
104. Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 471 n.4.
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impose a high standard."6 Some courts recognize that in the
context of discovery, materiality should be more broadly
construed to require production of documents when there is a
strong indication that they will play an important role in
"uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation,
corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment and
rebuttal.""' In United States v. Lloyd,'08 the District of Columbia
Circuit disagreed with the trial court's assessment that the
defendant had "a very heavy burden" to establish the
materiality of documents.0 9 The circuit court found that certain
records may have assisted the defendant in mounting a defense
that he did not have the requisite mens rea for the crime and
remanded the case to consider whether the improper denial of
discovery required granting a new trial."0
The failure to produce such evidence might not violate Brady,
but Rule 16(a)(1)(C) is not concerned with the effect of the
Government's suppression of evidence on the fairness of the
proceeding."' Instead, the Rule demands that the Government
permit the defendant to prepare a "defense," defined by the
Supreme Court as a "shield" from the Government. While Rule
16(a)(1)(C) does not make discovery a sword, neither is the right
afforded defendants subject to a high standard of materiality
that permits the Government to withhold evidence that
provides significant aid to the defendant in preparing for a
criminal trial-which is, perhaps, the most important
proceeding in that person's life.
Even with a lower materiality standard for Rule 16(a)(1)(C),
defendants do not have a license to compel the Government to
produce anydocument they believe might conceivably help the
defense. The Rule puts the initial burden on the defendant to
establish the materiality and possession of the documents, and
106. SeeUnited States v. George, 786 F. Supp. 11, 13 (D.D.C. 1991).
107. United States v. Gaddis, 877 F.2d 605,611 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v.
Felt, 491 F. Supp. 179, 186 (D.D.C. 1979)).
108. 992 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
109. Id. at 351.
110. Seeid. at 351-53.
111. See United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 911 (6th Cir. 1970) ("[The disclosure
required by Rule 16 is much broader than that required by the due process standards
of Brady.").
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courts describe that threshold as a "prima facie showing.""' The
Ninth Circuit stated, "Neither a general description of the
information sought nor conclusory allegations of materiality
suffice; a defendant must present facts which would tend to
show that the Government is in possession of information
helpful to the defense.""' In particular, courts are suspicious of
broadly-worded discovery requests that appear to be little more
than a scattershot attempt to have the Government search its
files for items it believes might be useful to a defendant,
especially material that will impeach government witnesses.
Sometimes labeled "fishing expeditions," vaguely worded
demands for expansive categories of records only elicit rebukes
from courts because Rule 16(a)(1)(C) is not akin to the broad
discovery available in a civil case."'
Defendants face the chicken-and-egg problem of establishing
the materiality of documents with enough specificity when they
have not reviewed them to know whether and how they are
helpful to a defense. The key step is identifying one or more
defenses that may be raised at trial, and then determining what
types of documents relate to that potential defense. In United
States v. Lloyd,"' the Government charged the defendant with
aiding and abetting the preparation of false income tax
returns."' The defendant sought copies of previous tax returns
filed by the clients who he was accused of assisting in hiding
income, arguing that the clients had misled him and, therefore,
he did not have the requisite intent to aid in the filing of false
tax returns."' The District of Columbia Circuit found sufficient
112. SeeUnited States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
113. United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990).
114. 'See, e.g. Cadet, 727 F.2d at 1468 ("A general description of the materials sought
or a conclusory argument as to their materiality is insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 16(a)(1)(C)."); United States v. Anderson, 31 F. Supp. 2d 933, 941
(D. Kan. 1998) ("The factthatthe defendants onlybelieve thatthe documents mayshow
lack of criminal intent indicates ... that they in any event are likely on a fishing
expedition. The defendants' request is simply not very specific . .. .") (emphasis in
original); United States v. Liquid Sugars, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 466, 472 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
("[R]equests which are designed to generally cast for impeachment material, and which
are not directly pertinent... are not material. Such requests are simply speculative
inquiries without basis in fact to believe that the information acquired will be
significantly helpful.").
115. 992 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
116. Seeid.at349.
117. Seeid. at349-50.
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indicia of the materiality of the requested records under Rule
16(a)(1)(C), even though the defendant was ignorant of their
contents and could not show that they would in fact be material
to the defense."8 The concept of helpfulness for determining
materiality refers to whether documents mayassist in preparing
the defense, not that the defendant demonstrate they actually
provide a defense, because that showing is virtually impossible
without access to the records.
Revealing a defense in order to gain access to documents
gives the Government an advantage by requiring a defendant
to reveal before trial how he will respond to the Government's
case. That is a strategic issue the defendant will have to decide,
weighing the benefits of reviewing documents that may not aid
a defense with the burden of giving the Government a preview
of the defense. The burden may not be that great in many cases,
however, because in white collar cases, at least, the defendants
rarely dispute their involvement in the underlying activity or
statements that maybe contained in documents. The key issues
are whether the statute covers the alleged misconduct and, if so,
whether the defendant had the requisite intent to commit the
crime. It is unlikely that the Government will learn much that
is useful if, in seeking discovery of documents under Rule
16(a)(1)(C), the defendant discloses that he did not know all that
took place or did not intend to cause a particular harm.
Moreover, the materiality threshold under the Rule should not
be a high one, so a district court should not compel a defendant
to disclose much more than howthe requested documents relate
to the broad outlines of the potential defenses. Discovery in a
white collar case proceeds from ignorance, not knowledge, so
requiring a defendant to show how a document will establish a
defense or significantly alter the quantum of proof at trial
ignores the mandate of Rule 16(a)(1)(C)-to provide defendants
access to items that will assist in their defense. To require more
turns the Rule into a shield for the Government, certainly a
result not contemplated in adopting a provision that
purportedly expands the right to discovery.
118. Seeid. at 351-52.
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C. Conclusion
Rule 16(a)(1)(C) provides an important means for defendants
to prepare for trial by ensuring that discovery is not limited to
the largesse of the prosecutor or willingness of a busy court to
rule favorably on a motion to compel the production of records.
Defendants who can identify documents that can provide
significant help in formulating a defense must be allowed to
review more than what the Government decides it will use at
trial or documents that the defendant already furnished during
the investigation. The concepts of possession and materiality
require a measure of flexibility that should reflect the fact that
adoption of the discovery rule was not to burden the prosecutor
with an irrelevant task but a means to ensure a fair proceeding.
Production of records must also be viewed as the product of
a developing understanding of the need to provide adequate
discovery in a criminal prosecution. Prior to its amendment in
1966, Rule 16 was limited to documents and othertangible items
seized or obtained by process, and then only upon a "showing of
materiality to the preparation of his defense and that the
request is reasonable."' 9 In 1966, the Advisory Committee
revised the Rule "to expand the scopb of pretrial discovery."'2
In 1974, when Rule 16(a)(1)(C) took its present form, the
Advisory Committee again sought to expand discovery for both
sides by, inter aHa, requiring the Government to disclose
evidence it intends to use in its case in chief and items obtained
from the defendant. 2' No longer did a defendant have to
demonstrate the materiality of these items. The Rule retained
the materiality requirement for documents that did not fall
within the parameters of the required production, making clear
that the discovery right reaches beyond just what the
Government considers important to a case.
The question remains, however, whether Rule 16 defines the
entirety of discovery in a federal criminal prosecution. If Rule
16 were the sole means by which a defendant could use the
machinery of the government to gather evidence, then a broad
category of potentially relevant evidence could only be obtained
119. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee notes to 1974 Amendment.
120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee notes to 1966 Amendment.
121. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C); FED. R. C(IM. P. 16 advisory committee notes to
1974 Amendment.
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by the defendant's own devices and powers of persuasion.
Documents that are not in the hands of the "government" are
not subject to discovery because Rule 16(a)(1)(C) only reaches
those offices that fall within the definitional scope of the Rule.
If a regulatory agency does not come within the ambit of the
"government" for the purposes of Rule 16(a)(1)(C), or ifa private
party holds the records, then a discovery order will not compel
the government to obtain and disclose those records.
Is a defendant completely bereft of any means to require a
third party to produce records? Rule 17(c) permits a defendant
to issue a subpoena duces tecum to require the recipient to
produce records at trial."= The Rule even provides that a court
can compel the subpoenaed party to produce the documents
before trial, thereby permitting the parties to examine them
without interrupting the proceeding." Rule 17(c) apparently
provides a grant of authority to defendants to use the power of
the government to obtain documents that fall outside the scope
of Rule 16(a)(1)(C). The defendant's ability to use a subpoena has
been severely, and by my reading improperly, restricted to only
those items the defendant can establish will be admissible at
trial. Courts support a narrow reading of the provision by
repeating a mantra that Rule 17(c) is not a discovery rule, which
is only permissible under Rule 16.124 That mantra is traceable to
two decisions by the Supreme Court that, while correct, used
overly broad language that created an unfortunate perception
of Rule 17(c) as a provision that provides only the most
constrained right of a defendant to gather evidence to prepare
for trial.2 ' Understood in context, the Court's decisions do not
support the broad dictum that Rule 17(c) cannot be used as a
means to secure at least some discovery of documents from
third parties.
122. See FED. R. Cium. P. 17(c).
123. See id.
124. See Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 241 (1951).
125. See id.; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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IV. RULE 17(c): THE SUBPOENA DUCES TEcUM
AS A MEANS OF DEFENSE DISCOVERY
A. The Development ofRule 17(c)
Rule 17 governs the issuance of subpoenas in criminal cases,
covering both the grand jury investigation and the trial of
criminal charges.'26 Rule 17 authorizes subpoenas to obtain
documents, subject to certain limitations:
(c) For production of Documentary Evidence and of
Objects. A subpoena may also command the person to
whom it is directed to produce the books, papers,
documents or other objects designated therein. The court on
motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena
if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The
court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects
designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at
a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to
be offered in evidence and may upon their production
permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions
thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.' 7
The Rule appears to provide a broad mandate to both sides to
use the compulsory process of the courts to gather evidence for
use at trial, including a mechanism for the pre-trial production
of the items. Rule 17(c) remains unchanged since the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1944. The original
Advisory Committee Notes on the provision convey a similarly
broad understanding of the authority to issue subpoenas,
stating in its entirety: "This rule is substantially the same as
rule 45(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.,
Appendix."' 28
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(b), referred to in the
Advisory Committee Notes as the analogue for Rule 17(c),
authorized issuance of a subpoena compelling a non-party to
produce documents at a deposition. 19 Rule 45(b) was part of a
126. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
127. Seeid.
128. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 advisory committee notes to 1944 Adoption.
129. A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the
books, papers, or documents, designated therein. See FED.R. CIrv. P. 45(a)(1)C). The 1948
amendment added "tangible things" to the items subject to a subpoena. See CHARLES
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liberal civil discovery regime providing that "[p]arties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action .... The information sought need not be admissible at
the trial ifthe information sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."'30
What did the Advisory Committee mean when it asserted that
Rule 17(c) is "substantially the same as rule 45(b)"? Rule 17(c) is
not limited only to subpoenas to nonparties, and while the
language of the provisions is similar, it is not identical.3 ' For
example, Rule 45(b) permitted the recipient to move to quash
the subpoena if compliance would be "unreasonable and
oppressive," while Rule 17(c) authorizes a motion to quash or
modify the subpoena "if compliance would be unreasonable or
oppressive. ' More importantly, the policy supporting the
broad right to discovery in civil cases is radically different from
the limited discovery available under Rule 16, which originally
limited discovery to those documents the Government
"obtained from others by seizure or by process upon a showing
that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his
defense and that the request is reasonable."'33 Unlike civil
discovery, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure begin with
the presumption that discovery for a criminal defendant is a
limited right. The broad subpoena authority set forth in Rule
17(c), not limited to just non-parties to the prosecution, would
essentially swallow the more modest provision for discovery
granted in Rule 16 if interpreted along the lines of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 45(b). Rule 17(c) is an enigma because it
cannot be interpreted as authorizing an alternative form of
discovery through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
despite the unadorned language of the provision apparently
granting such a right.
The Advisory Committee's reference to Rule 45(a) is
enlightening, however, by putting in context the grant of
authority for subpoenas for records in criminal cases. Until
ALANWRIGHT&ARTHURR.MILLER,9AFEDERALPRAcTcIE &PROCEDURE (CIVL) § 2451
(1995) (reviewing history of Rule 45).
130. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(1).
131. Seeid. at 17(c).
132. See id. (emphasis added); FED. R. CIv. P. 45 (emphasis added).
133. FED. R. CRmi. P. 16 (amended 1966).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 was amended in 1991, a civil
litigant's demand for documents from a nonparty could only be
made through a subpoena directing the witness to produce the
documents at a deposition. On the other hand, a litigant could
compel another party to produce records by a request under
Rule 34(a)." 4 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided
different means for gathering documents, depending on the
document holder's relation to the underlying proceeding. Rule
16, limited as it is, is the effective counterpart to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 34-governing the discovery rights between the
parties without reference to obtaining records from a third
party. Using the limited scope of Rule 45(a) as a guide, Rule
17(c) should be understood to provide authority to subpoena
third parties to produce records and not as a potential means to
supplant the limited discovery right of Rule 16, which governs
the discovery duty owed to the other party. The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure only provided for depositions in
"exceptional circumstances,"' 35 so the provision in Rule 17(c)
calling for pretrial production of records to the court is more in
the nature of a substitute for the civil deposition than a
substantive limitation on the right to compel a third party to
produce documents.
The failure to identify clearly that Rule 17(c) only authorizes
subpoenas for records to non-parties opened an avenue for
defendants to bypass the more limited discovery right provided
in Rule 16. They took advantage of the Rule's broad language by
issuing subpoenas to the government for documents that the
prosecutor did not have to produce otherwise because the
records fell outside the bounds of Rule 16. Rather than treat
Rule 16 as the exclusive means of discovery from the opposing
party in the case, courts considered whether Rule 17(c) granted
a broader discovery right that effectively supplanted Rule 16.
Early cases analyzed whether, for example, defendants could
compel production of their statements,"' statements of other
134. FED. R. CRIM. P. 34(a).
135. Id. at 15(a).
136. See Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134, 137-38 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (denying
inspection of defendant's statement); United States v. Kiamie, 18 F.R.D. 421, 423-24
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (denying inspection of defendant's statement); United States v. Bryson,
16 F.R.D. 431,437 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (granting inspection of defendant's statement),
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witnesses,"' impeachment evidence,'3 ' and all documents
obtained during the course of an investigation.' The Supreme
Court entered the fray by reviewing a defense subpoena to the
prosecutors in Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States4, and
changed the balance between the discovery right of Rule 16 and
the subpoena authority of Rule 17(c). 4'
B. Bowman Dairy: The Confusion Begins
In Bowman Dairy, the grand jury indicted the defendants for
an antitrust violation, and before trial, they subpoenaed the
prosecutors to produce all documents gathered in the
investigation, including documents the Government intended
to introduce at trial.' 2 The documents at issue included
materials voluntarily supplied by third parties for the
Government's use in the grand jury investigation.43 The
Government moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that
"the access of a defendant in a criminal proceeding to materials
in custody of Government attorneys is limited to rights granted
by Rule 16 .. ."' The Supreme Court noted that due to the
limited scope of Rule 16, only those records "obtained from
others by seizure or by process" were subject to disclosure.45
The Court held that, to the extent records held by the
Government were not subject to Rule 16, "[n]o good reason
appears to us why they may not be reached by subpoena under
Rule 17(c) as long as they are evidentiary."'46 The Court never
137. SeeUnited States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696,707-08 (W.D. La. 1949) (denying
inspection of coconspirator's grand jury testimony); United States v. Brown, 17 F.R.D.
286, 288 (N.D. IM. 1955) (denying inspection of written statements of prospective
witnesses); United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 272-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (denying
inspection of written statements of witnesses).
138. Compare Fryer, 207 F.2d at 137 (ruling that documents for impeachment are
evidentiaryunderRule 17(c)), withUnited States v. Schneiderman, 104F. Supp. 405,410
(S.D. Cal. 1952) (denying inspection of documents for rebuttal or impeachment as they
would not aid in preparation of a defense).
139. See United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 509
(D.D.C. 1949) (refusing to permit inspection ofall records gathered in an investigation).
140. 341 U.S. 214 (1951).
141. See id. at 218-21.
142. See id. at 215-16.
143. Seeid. at217.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 219.
146. Id. The subpoena had to reflect a "good faith effort... to obtain evidence." Id. at
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explained why it read Rule 17(c) as reaching documents that
were not subject to disclosure according to a clearly described,
albeit quite limited, discovery provision.
Having recognized the broad applicability of Rule 17(c), the
Court in Bowman Dairyhad to keep it from swallowing Rule 16.
The Court asserted, "It was not intended by Rule 16 to give a
limited right of discovery, and then by Rule 17 to give a right of
discovery in the broadest terms .... Rule 17(c) was notintended
to provide an additional means of discovery. 4' The Court
somehow asserted this despite enforcing the subpoena for some
of the Government's documents, thereby granting discovery
through the auspices of Rule 17(c). If Rule 17(c) only pertained
to a subpoena issued to the opposing party, then the Court's
statement might be a defensible reading of the provision. Rule
17(c), however, makes no mention of any limitation regarding
who can be subpoenaed for records, so the Court's holding, that
the defendants could compel the Government to turn over
documents not subject to the discovery provision, was
unsupportable. If the Court's concern was that Rule 16 was too
narrow, precluding a defendant from reaching important
materials, the answer was to change the Rule that it approved
just a few years earlier. The problem, of course, was that in the
case before it, important documents the Government planned
to use to prove the defendant's guilt had been turned over to the
Government voluntarily and, therefore, were exempt from
discovery because they were neither seized nor obtained by
process. The Court apparently found Rule 16 unduly restrictive
of the defendant's ability to prepare for trial because the Rule
rendered important evidence unavailable until the Government
chose to introduce it at trial.
While enforcing the subpoena to the prosecutor in Bowman
Dairy solved the immediate problem of disclosure of relevant
documents by the Government, the Court's broad assertion that
Rule 17(c) was not a means of discovery was wrong. Understood
in the context of the too-narrow grant of discovery under Rule
16, the Court permitted a novel use of Rule 17(c), authorizing a
subpoena duces tecumto the prosecutor that effectively created
a new discovery right. As Rule 16(a)(1)(C) now reads, the
220.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
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defendants in Bowman Dairy would receive all of the
Government's exhibits, including those drawn from voluntarily
supplied documents, plus any other records that they could
show were "material to preparation of the defendant's
defense."'' It is unlikely that today someone in the position of
the Bowman Dairydefendants would need to issue a subpoena
for the types of documents at issue in the case, and if one were
issued, it would likely be quashed. In light of the changes in
the discovery rule, the Court's limited reading of the scope of
Rule 17(c) in Bowman Daizyshouldbe rewritten as follows: Rule
17(c) was not intended to provide an additional means of
discovery against the Government ofdocuments alreadysubject
to Rule 16.150
Although it acquiesced in a defendant subpoenaing the
prosecutor, the Court limited its enforcement of the subpoena
to items that were "admissible as evidence, obtained by the
Government by solicitation or voluntarily from third
persons . . . ."'l Rule 17(c) permits the production of items
148. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
149. See CHAPLESALANWRIGHT,2FEDERALPRACrICE&PROCEDURE (CRUvmAL) § 274,
at 158 (2d ed. 1982) ("The distortion of Rule 17(c) that resulted from the desire to use it
for discovery purposes should be ended with the 1966 amendments of Rule 16. Any
document that might previously have been obtained by defendant through use of a
subpoena duces tecum may now be obtained by discovery.").
150. The only authority that Rule 17(c) does not provide a means for discovery cited
by the Supreme Court was United States v. Maryland& Virginia MilkProducersAss'n,
9 F.R.D. 509 (D.D.C. 1949), a similar antitrust prosecution involving dairy products in
which the defendants sought all documents obtained by the government, just as the
defendants subpoenaed in Bowman Daiy. Judge Holtzoff, the secretary to the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, was the trial judge in Maryland
& Virginia Milk ProducersAss n. He rejected the broad subpoena duces tecum on that
ground that Rule 17(c)'s sole purpose "is merely to shorten the trial. It is not intended
as a discovery provision." Id. at 510. The court's one-page opinion did not cite any
support for that proposition, nor is there an analysis of the structure or history of the
Rule to explain why the authority to compel the production of records from any person
is not a means of discovery. While it may have been Judge Holtzoffs view as a
participant in the drafting of the Rule, his ipse dbiit proclamation of the meaning of
Rule 17(c) certainly is not consistent vAth either the broad language of Rule 17(c) or its
analogue in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that permitted subpoenas to non-
parties for documents. The Rule does not provide a means to avoid the limitations of
Rule 16 on discovery from the government, but that does not mean it cannot be used as
a means for discovery outside that context. For a history of Rule 17(c) and discussion of
Judge Holtzoffs role, see Lester B. Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal
Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REV. 312,326-27 (1957).
151. Bowman Dairy v. United States, 341 U.S. 214,221 (1951) (emphasis added).
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pursuant to a subpoena "prior to the time they are to be offered
in evidence."'' This evidentiary limitation on the scope of a
Rule 17(c) subpoena allowed the Court to require the
Government to produce documents it intended to use at trial,
because those items were evidence by definition, without at the
same time granting defendants the right to pursue a broad
range of documents from the Government that might not be
part of its case in chief. In order to keep this new disclosure
obligation as narrow as possible, the Court converted the timing
notion in Rule 17(c) to strictly limit what would be subject to the
subpoena under Bowman Daryjs interpretation of the Rule:
only those records or objects that the defendant demonstrated
would be admissible at trial could be obtained at the time of the
subpoena's issuance.5 3 In this manner, the Court rejected the
defendant's expansive request for all documents gathered in the
investigation "whether or not they might constitute evidence
with respect to the guilt or innocence of any of the
defendants. ' 'lM Mixing in an aquatic metaphor that is oft-
repeated in this area, the Court assailed the defendants' catch-
all demand as "merely a fishing expedition to see what may turn
up."'
1 55
Bowman Dairyessentially created a discovery right against
the Government broader than that provided in Rule 16. The
Supreme Court's simultaneous effort to limit the scope of this
new right ensured confusion when readwith the Court's blanket
assertion that Rule 17(c) is not a means for defendants to engage
in discovery. The Court adopted the concept that the subpoena
could only compel the production of evidence and strictly
defined that term so that a defendant would have to meet a high
threshold before the subpoena could be enforced against the
prosecutor. 5 ' What the Court failed to consider was the effect of
its analysis on what appears to be the original purpose of Rule
17(c), recognized by the Advisory Committee, that defendants
152. FED. R. CPmW. P. 17(c).
153. See Bowman DaiLy, 341 U.S. at 221.
154. Id.
155. Id. Itis not clearwhethera recreational excursion such as a fishing trip "turns up"
much of anything beyond tall tales, but that was the extent of the Court's analysis of
why a broadly written subpoena was unsatisfactory under Rule 17(c). See id.
156. Seeid.
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could obtain documents from third parties prior to trial by a
subpoena duces tecum.
Bowman Daizy shifted the focus of the Rule to determining
what constitutes "evidence" that may be subject to a subpoena
for production before trial. The Court addressed that issue again
in a little-noticed aspect of one of its most famous cases, United
States v. Nixon,"7 in which resolution of the Rule 17(c) issue was
the pivotal first step in the process of deciding one of the most
important separation of powers cases in the Court's history.
C. Nixon: Don't Forget Who Was Asking
The prosecution at issue in Nixon involved the former
Attorney General and six high-ranking aides to President
Richard Nixon charged by the Special Prosecutor with, among
other things, conspiracy and obstruction of justice.'58 After
indicting the defendants, the Special Prosecutor issued a
subpoena duces tecum to President Nixon for pretrial
production of tapes "relating to certain precisely identified
meetings between the President and others."'59 The President
asserted executive privilege regarding the tapes, and further
sought to quash the subpoena on the ground that the Special
Prosecutor had not met the requirements of Rule 17(c) for
pretrial production. 6 '
The Court began its analysis by noting that the only ground
for quashing a subpoena provided by the Rule was if the
production would be "unreasonable or oppressive."'61 The Court
then cited its decision in Bowman Dairyas the "leading case" on
this standard, despite the fact that the earlier opinion never
referred to the "unreasonable or oppressive" language as a basis
for its decision.'62 In fact, Bowman Dairzyfocused on whether the
items were "evidentiary" in order to determine whether to
157. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
158. Seeid.at 687.
159. Id. at 688. "The Special Prosecutor was able to fix the time, place, and persons
present at these discussions because the White House daily logs and appointment
records hadbeen deliveredto him." Id. Presumably, the SpecialProsecutor obtainedthe
information that allowed him to detail exactly which tapes were sought had been
obtained through a grand jury subpoena duces tecum.
160. Seeid. at 688, 697.
161. Seeid.at698.
162. Seeid.
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permit a defendant to gain discovery from the Government
beyond the confines of Rule 16.163 Nixon then adopted District
Judge Weinfeld's four-part test announced in United States v.
Iozia" for what constitutes "evidentiary" material that a party
may seek through a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 17(c) for
pretrial production:
Under this test, in order to require production prior to trial,
the moving party must show: (1) that the documents are
evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise
procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due
diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial
without such production and inspection in advance of trial
and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend
unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application
is made in good faith and is not intended as a general
"fishing expedition."165
The Nixon Court then boiled the test down into a simple three-
part requirement a party must meet for enforcement of a
subpoena: "(1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; [and] (3)
specificity."'16
6
Looking at the Special Prosecutor's subpoena for the tapes,
the Court had no trouble finding that the three elements for a
subpoena were met. Regarding specificity, the Special
Prosecutor identified the dates, times, and participants in the
recorded meetings, and through cooperating witnesses, could
even offer a description of the subjects discussed.' 7 For the
purely evidentiary issues of relevancy and admissibility, the
defendants participated in some of the conversations, so the
conspiracy charge meant that the statements of coconspirators
would be admissible against each conspirator underthe hearsay
rule.'68 The Special Prosecutor had already amassed powerful
evidence of group criminality, and the tapes proved to be the
coup de grace for the Nixon presidency. The Court adopted a
163. See Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 221 (1951).
164. 13 F.R.D. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
165. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699-700.
166. Id. at 700.
167. See id ('With respect to many of the tapes, the Special Prosecutor offered the
sworn testimony or statements of one or more of the participants in the conversations
as to what was said at the time.").
168. Seeid. at 700-01.
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high standard for enforcement of the subpoena because it was
mindful of the sensitive issues it faced, noting that "[i]n a case
such as this ... where a subpoena is directed to a President of
the United States, appellate review, in deference to a coordinate
branch of Government, should be particularly meticulous to
ensure that the standards of Rule 17(c) have been correctly
applied."'169
Nixon's tripartite requirement of relevancy, admissibility, and
specificity for enforcement of a subpoena under Rule 17(c) has
the virtue of being plain and direct in addressing the significant
issues facing the Court. Despite the weighty matters of
constitutional law it grappled with, the Court took only sixteen
days after the oral argument to issue its unanimous opinion.70
The Rule 17(c) issue, while an important prelude, was unlikely
to generate much controversy given the strength of the Special
Prosecutor's evidence supporting the subpoena. Therefore, it is
understandable that the Court adopted a high standard because,
first, it would be met by the Special Prosecutor and, second, it
demonstrated the care the Court took in reviewing an order
compelling the President to turn over the tapes. Yet, in
establishing the standard for enforcement of a subpoena under
Rule 17(c), the Court never considered the context in which the
case arose. Nixon apparently adopted a single standard for
judging the propriety of every subpoena seeking pretrial
production of records.'7'
Unlike Bowman Dairy, however, Nixon involved a prosecutor,
not a defendant, seeking items after an indictment. The
existence of the tapes was known to the Special Prosecutor
before the grand jury handed up its indictment, having been
revealed the prior year in the Senate Watergate hearings, so a
grand jury subpoena could have been used to obtain the tapes
from the President prior to the indictment of the President's
former aides. While the President could have raised the same
privilege claim at that point in the investigation, the Special
Prosecutor had at his disposal the broad authority of the grand
jury, which is entitled to "every man's evidence," yet chose to
169. Id. at 702.
170. Seeid.at 683.
171. Seeid. at699-700.
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forego that option for obtaining the information."' 2 A prosecutor
has a powerful means of gathering evidence before filing
charges, unlike a defendant, so the choice of using a subpoena
duces tecum to obtain evidence after an indictment should be
subject to a higher standard.
The Court recognized in United States v. R. Enterprises,
Inc."3 that grand jury subpoenas are different from trial
subpoenas under Rule 17(c). 4 The Court held that "the Nixon
standard does not apply in the context of grand jury
proceedings," 75 and that a grand jury subpoena is enforceable
"unless the diitrict court determines that there is no reasonable
possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks
will produce information relevant to the general subject of the
grand jury's investigation."' The question is whether Nixon's
high standard should also apply to defendants issuing
subpoenas who did not, and could not, use a grand jury to
gather evidence to aid their defense. R. Enterprisesmakes clear
that the "unreasonable or oppressive" standard for quashing a
subpoena differs depending on whether the Government issues
the subpoena during a grand jury investigation or after filing
charges. Rule 17(c) does not impose a unitary standard of
reasonableness, so there does not appear to be an apioireason
why a court cannot use a different standard than Nixon's in
deciding whether to enforce a defense subpoena for records
from a third party than it would apply to the Government.
Nixon is a reasonable standard to apply to prosecutors who
seek additional evidence to bolster their case, having already
gathered sufficient information to decide to seek an indictment
and commence the process leading to a criminal trial. The
Government has the advantage of the grand jury because of the
172. Seeid.at 687.
173. 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
174. Seeid. at 297-99.
175. Id. at 300.
176. Id. at 301. The lower court applied Nixon's three-part test to determine the
enforcability of a grand jury subpoena for videotapes related to an obscenity
investigation. Consistentwith other decisions regardingwhat evidence a grand juy can
consider, the Court adopted a low standard for determining what evidence the grand
jury can gather as part of its investigation. See id. ; United States v. Williams, 504 U.S.
36,52-54 (1992) (finding no authority for a district court to require prosecutor to present
exculpatory evidence to grand jury); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-18 (1973)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to grand jury subpoena).
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burden it bears in establishing guilt at trial beyond a reasonable
doubt. Applying the identical standard for Rule 17(c) subpoenas
to defendants is wrong because they have none of the
investigatory advantages of the Government, nor the means to
compel the production of items about which they may not have
a significant amount of information. Treating defendants and
prosecutors identically under Rule 17(c) ignores the important
distinctions between them. Nixon imposed a high standard, but
not because the language of Rule 17(c) either demands or
implies that every party using a subpoena for pretrial
production establish relevancy, admissibility, and specificity to
compel the production of documents. The Rule is silent on what
is required before a court can require pretrial production, and
Bowman Dairyand Nixon do not provide the only, or even the
best, interpretation of the defendant'sright to subpoena a third
party to produce records.
D. Defense Subpoenas Under Rule 17(c): Changing the
Perceived Wisdom
Professor Wright's treatise on federal practice summarized
quite starkly an unreflective view of the effect of Bowman Dairy
and Nixon on subpoenas by defendants: "The availability of
Rule 16 should now make it impossible to show good cause for
use of Rule 17(c) as a discovery device."' 7 Courts have relied on
these two Supreme Court opinions to assail discovery requests
under Rule 17(c) as "more in the nature of a 'treasure hunt,' "
or as a "pure total fishing expedition."'7 9 In United States v.
Najarian, '8 the district court asserted that "if the restrictions of
Rule 17(c), upon full-bodied discovery in criminal proceedings,
should appear to be unduly constraining, then the answer would
seem to lie in its amendment so as to provide for a more
expansive exploration into the documentary evidence of third-
persons."'' The district court's statement exemplifies a
misapprehension, because Rule 17(c) shouldprovide defendants
the means to gather documents from third parties that
177. WRIGHT, supra note 149, § 274, at 158.
178. United States v. Najarian, 164 F.R.D. 484,487 (D. Minn. 1995).
179. United States v. Hang, 75 F.3d 1275, 1283-84 (8th Cir. 1996).
180. 164 F.R.D. 484 (D. Minn. 1995).
181. Id. at 488 n.3.
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supplement the discovery provided by Rule 16, but do not
supplant it.
The problem with the high threshold set by Nixon is that it
can discourage defense counsel from even attempting to gather
documents from third parties. Courts considering requests for
pretrial production of documents under Rule 17(c) require the
defendant to demonstrate the contents of the documents, to
meet the specificity element, and to describe how the item will
be admissible and relevant evidence that will establish a
defense. As one district court described the burden on the
defendant, "The moving party must specify why the materials
are wanted, what information is contained in the documents,
and why those documents would be relevant and admissible at
trial."'182 The Nixon standard is not easily met because "the
documents sought cannot be potentiallyrelevant or admissible,
they must meet the test of relevancy and admissibility at the
time they are sought.'8 3 The problem encountered under Rule
16 for determining what is material is exacerbated when the
defendant must demonstrate both the content of the document
and its evidentiary use at trial before being allowed to examine
it to prepare for trial. The Supreme Court's restrictive
interpretation of Rule 17(c) can make a subpoena for records
hardly worth the effort, or at least an avenue that only the most
hardy defense counsel will travel when the chance for success
seems so remote.
I do not mean to imply that defendants never succeed in
obtaining pretrial discovery of documents held by third parties
under the restrictive analysis of Bowman Dairyand Nixon. In In
re Martn Marietta Corp.," the trial court ordered production to
the defendant before trial of the internal audit work papers of
his former employer in a mail fraud prosecution based on
alleged falsified travel records submitted by the defendant to
the government for reimbursement.'85 The trial court found the
defendant satisfied Nixon's requirement of relevance,
admissibility, and specificity by disclosing how the documents
182. United States v. Jackson, 155 F.R.D. 664,668 (D. Kan. 1994).
183. United States v. Burger, 773 F. Supp. 1419,1424 (D. Kan. 1991) (emphasis added).
184. 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988).
185. Seeid. at 622.
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related to his defense, "that he was made a scapegoat"'86 for
overbilling by his corporate employer, even though the
subpoena only described the general category of documents
sought."' Similarly, in United States v. Caruso,'8 8 the district
court refused to quash a subpoena duces tecum issued to the
defendant's former employer for documents related to the
organization's internal policies and procedures.'89 The court
found that the records met the Nixon test because of the
relationship to the defendant's assertion that they would assist
him in establishing that he did not have the requisite intent to
defraud the employer.'90
In each case, the defendants' success in gaining access to
documents before trial was dependent on the fact that the
defendants already knew, based on their employment, which
types of documents the former employer held. Requiring that a
defendant essentially know the contents of documents before
they can be subpoenaed puts defense counsel in an almost
untenable situation. So long as courts repeat the mantra of
Bowman Dairy and Nixon that Rule 17(c) is not a means of
discovery for a defendant, then the requirement that defendants
show the content of records to which they may not have had
access will deter adequate pretrial preparation.
If Rule 17(c) is viewed as an adjunct to the discovery provided
by Rule 16, at least giving defendants a means to review
documents held by third parties, then a more balanced
approach can be formulated. Even Professor Wright now
acknowledges the utility of subpoenas to third parties, stating
that "Rule 16 does not apply to documents in the hands of third
persons and Rule 17(c) may still be useful to obtain such
documents."' 9 ' In United States v. Tomison,'92 the district court
186. Id.
187. See id. at 622. The court even required disclosure of the corporation's
administrative settlements with the government relating to the overbilling on the
ground that defendant's request was "at least a good faith effort to acquire evidence ...
for a defense that Martin Marietta hung him out to dry while protecting its own
interest." Id.
188. 948 F. Supp. 382 (D.N.J. 1996).
189. Seeid.at397.
190. Seeid. ("The documents are relevantto establishing the defendant's state ofmind
at the time of the offense, and as such would be admissible at trial.").
191. WRIGHT, supra note 149, § 274, at 53 n.29 (Supp. 1998).
192. 969 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
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stated that "[t]he notion that because Rule 16 provides for
discovery, Rule 17(c) has no role in the discovery of documents
can, of course, only apply to documents in the government's
hands; accordingly, Rule 17(c) may well be a proper device for
discovering documents in the hands of third parties."
193
If Rule 17(c) provides a means for defendants to discover
documents held by third parties, then the requirements for
obtaining pretrial disclosure need not mimic those adopted in
Nixon, which should only apply to Government subpoenas for
evidence that could have been obtained by a grand jury
subpoena prior to indictment. Understanding Rule 17(c) as a
limited discovery device does not mean that defendants can use
it to bypass the limitations of Rule 16(a)(1)(C). Instead, it would
be fair to look to Rule 16 as a guide for the scope of the
defendant's Rule 17(c) right to obtain documents from third
parties. The initial point is that the documents subject to a
subpoena cannot already be discoverable under Rule 16,
precluding a defendant from using Rule 17(c) to avoid the
strictures of Rule 16. The teaching of Bowman Daizy at least
requires respect for the structure of discovery adopted by
Congress by not having one rule supplant another.
Assuming the Government, as defined by Rule 16(a)(1)(C), did
not have possession of the records, then the defendant's
subpoena would seek items that the Government did not
consider important enough to gather during its own
investigation, or about which it was unaware. In either case, the
documents did not come from the defendant and the
prosecution did not intend to use them in the Government's
case in chief. A Rule 17(c) subpoena to a third party seeking
production of documents, therefore, would be analogous to a
Rule 16(a)(1)(C) discovery request for items that are material to
a defendant's defense.' Evaluation of the defendant's right to
subpoena a third party should track the materiality analysis for
discovery because in each case the right to discovery requires
an initial showing bythe defendant of good cause for production
of the documents. The judicial abhorrence of "fishing
expeditions" in Rule 17(c) cases would remain intact, even
under a lower standard for defense subpoenas to third parties,
193. Id. at 593 n.14.
194. SeeFED.R.CRM.P. 16(a)(1)(C).
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because the defendant would still have to establish the need for
the document and its relation to a defense at trial. Moreover,
limiting discovery to items which the Government did not
obtain in its investigation blocks defendants who try to bypass
the limitations on disclosure of witness statements under the
Jencks Act'95 because Rule 16 discovery does not permit
disclosure of those items before trial.'96
Rule 17(c) contains only one express ground on which to
challenge a subpoena, that it is "unreasonable or oppressive."'9 7
The Supreme Court's interpretation of that standard in Nixon
and 1. Enterpiisesdemonstrates that reasonableness under the
Rule is contingent on the circumstances in which the subpoena
arose.'98 Imposing a materiality requirement similar to Rule
16(a)(1)(C) for evaluating defense subpoenas to third parties is
another form of the reasonableness analysis, allowing the court
to compel pretrial production only after the defendant shows
that the information is significantly helpful to a defense to the
charges at trial. This adaptation of the materiality requirement
as a determination of the subpoena's reasonableness permits
courts to police subpoenas to nonparties to ensure that
defendants do not cast a wide net seeking anything that might
be of some slight interest in the hope of landing a helpful item.
Yet, a reasonableness requirement lower than that of Nixon
better reflects the defendant's position as a person without the
investigatory authority or resources of the Government. While
a defendant must have more than a mere inkling about the
contents of a third party's documents, the standard would
permit discovery even though the defendant cannot describe
the documents with sufficient clarity to meet the three Nixon
requirements of admissibility, relevance, and specificity. As one
district court pointed out, "Of course one person's fishing
expedition is another's exhaustive investigation."'99 A discovery
right limited to only the Government's documents, and those
195. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994).
196. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) ("Nor does the rule authorize the discovery or
inspection of statements made by government witnesses or prospective government
witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.").
197. Seeid. at 17(c).
198. SeeUnited States v. Nixon,418 U.S. 683,699-700 (1994); United States v. R. Enter.,
498 U.S. 292, 297-99 (1991).
199. United States v. Tomison, 969 F. Supp. 587, 594 n.18 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
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few instances in which a defendant can meet the Nixon
requirements, makes adequate preparation, especially in a
white collar prosecution, far from meaningful.
In United States v. Arditti,20 Circuit Judge Goldberg stated in
a concurring opinion, "Rule 16, which severely restricts
discovery in criminal cases, does not define the outer limits of
materials available under a Rule 17(c) subpoena .... ,,201 The
analysis that I propose of defense subpoenas to third parties
under Rule 17(c) reflects the necessity of defending a white
collar criminal prosecution. The documents are the key to the
case, and adequate preparation requires access to more than
just what the prosecutor saw fit to gather in the investigation. A
government agency that has documents related to the case, but
is not sufficiently close to the prosecutor to fit under Rule
16(a)(1)(C)'s definition of "government," would be a non-party
subject to a defense subpoena under the proposed
interpretation of Rule 17(c). If the defendant can establish the
materiality of the documents, it is illogical to permit the
prosecutor to oppose discovery of records under Rule 16(a)(1)(C)
on the ground that they are not in the government's possession,
and then oppose a subpoena under Rule 17(c) for the same
records by arguing that the defendant cannot establish the
requisite evidentiary foundation for them. Applying two
standards to the defendant's discovery undermines the goal of
a fair proceeding through a hypertechnical application of the
Rules that allows the prosecutor to thwart disclosure of material
documents.
White collar crimes involve common occurrences that become
criminal through the manipulation of business acts and the
intent of the participants to engage in criminal conduct. The
transfer of money for a product can change from being ordinary
to criminal because of what takes place beneath the surface.
Unlike a street crime, white collar crimes are common acts
made criminal, and it is the documents reflecting the conduct
that are crucial to establishing whether or not a crime occurred.
Denying a defendant access to documents held by third parties,
including agencies unaffiliated with the prosecutor, simply
because the Supreme Court tried to mask what it did in
200. 955 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1992).
201. Id. at 346-47 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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Bowman Dairyby asserting that Rule 17(c) is not a discovery
device elevates an obfuscation into a meaningful legal doctrine.
Bowman Dairyand Nixon stand for the untenable principle that
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure exclude a critical area
from defense discovery except in those few situations when the
defendant can show that he knows what is there before even
seeing the documents. There is nothing in the Rules that
reflects such a restrictive view of the defendant's right to
discovery, and indeed the language of Rule 17(c) points in the
opposite direction.
Bowman Dairy and Nixon do not forestall completely a
defendant's efforts to secure documents before trial from third
parties, but make it unnecessarily difficult by imposing a high
threshold for invoking Rule 17(c) that focuses on the evidentiary
nature of the requested documents without reference to the
defense at trial. The important limitation on discovery since the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has been
materiality to the defense, notwhether the document subject to
disclosure meets the prerequisites for admission into evidence
at trial. Rule 17(c) shouldbe understood as a counterpart to Rule
16, providing a limited avenue of defense discovery of
documents held by third parties that are material to a defense
against the government charges. The perceivedwisdom derived
from Bowman Diary and Nixon goes too far, and the higher
standard they prescribe for defense subpoenas to non-parties for
documents misapplies the Rules and denigrates the concept of
a fair criminal trial.
CONCLUSION
In a white collar criminal prosecution, the need to gather
documents is not a pleasant task. Upon indictment, the
Government may dump a small mountain of documents on the
defense and invite the opposing lawyer to dive in. At the outset,
there may appear to be more than enough to defend the case.
The question then arises, however, "Do I trust the
Government?" If you do, then what the Government provides
will be enough to defend the case. If not, then the defense
lawyer must try to gather more documents. At that point, the
defense has to navigate through Rule 16(a)(1)(C) and determine
whether the Government has any other documents helpful to
647
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:601
prepare the defense; quite often, the Government has more
than it turns over at the start of the case. If the defense obtains
additional documents from the prosecution, the nagging
question still remains, "Do I trust the Government?" Now, the
issue is whether other agencies have documents relevant to the
case, and whether third parties have records that the
prosecution did not seek in its investigation or may not have
known exist. The small mountain can quickly grow to
overwhelm the defense. Yet, to adequately prepare to defend a
white collar criminal prosecution, the task of gathering
documents cannot be avoided.
Discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
an odd dance that requires defense counsel to make some rather
fine distinctions in the rush to prepare for trial. Attorneys who
simply ask the court to grant discovery of everything
imaginable, without paying attention to the different standards
and means for gathering evidence before trial, invite problems
in preparing their case. That scattershot approach is especially
harmfulwhen the Government brings a white collar prosecution
because securing the documents is the key to adequate
preparation. This Article argues that the barriers to defense
discovery of documents should be lowered in a manner
consistent with the language of the Rules, although not to such
a degree as to give the defendant unimpeded discovery. The
defense of a white collar criminal case demands that there be
avenues of discovery available upon a reasonable showing of
need by the defendant. The Article's analysis focuses on the
language of the Rules and how they should be understood as
providing a regulated means of compelling the production of
documents that does not give either side an unfettered right to
acquire information, unlike the approach in civil cases.
Simply repeating the mantra that there is no right to
discovery in a criminal case cannot justify reading the discovery
provisions narrowly at every turn. The right to discovery
granted in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
important, especially in a white collar case in which access to
documents is so crucial. The Rules need to be understood in the
context of a congressional decision to permit meaningful
discovery. Similarly, the Supreme Court's analysis of Rule 17(c)
needs to be considered against the backdrop of the type of
discovery claim being asserted and who was seeking discovery.
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The Court's broad language has been misunderstood as
adopting a narrow interpretation of the Rule that is not
consistent with its language or role in the provision of discovery
rights.
In UnitedStates v. Burr,"2 Chief Justice Marshall reflected on
the role of discovery in the criminal prosecution of Aaron Burr
for treason:
The court would not lend its aid to motions obviously
designed to manifest disrespect to the government; but the
court has no right to refuse its aid to motions for papers to
which the accused may be entitled, and which may be
material in his defence... If it be apparent that the papers
are irrelative to the case, or that for stated reasons they
cannot be introduced into the defence, the subpoena duces
tecum would be useless. But, if this be not apparent, if they
may be important in the defence, if they may be safely read
at the trial, would it not be a blot in the page which records
the judicial proceedings of this country, if, in a case of such
serious import as this, the accused should be denied the use
of them?23
Discovery is not a game, or a series of hurdles thrown in front of
a defendant to see how hard the defense is willing to work to
gather the information. Discovery is a means to ensure a fair
trial, one in which each side has a chance to put on its case. The
goal should be to apply the Rules so that there are no blots on
the page of justice.
202. 25 F.Cas. 30 (C.C. Va. 1807).
203. Id. at 35.
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